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POWER TO THE PRISONER: THE
IMPORTANCE OF STATE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ACTS IN PRESERVING THE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES OF PRISONERS
Benjamin S. Fischer*
INTRODUCTION
Several states have enacted legislation restoring strict
scrutiny1 to any law, rule or regulation that interferes with an
individual’s free exercise of religion.2 These state Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts (“state RFRAs”) were enacted to
replace the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”), which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in City of Boerne v. Flores.3 While these state RFRAs may
*Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2002; B.A., Connecticut College, 1997.
The author would like to thank his parents, Lynn and Jeff Fischer, and Emily
Sollinger for their constant love and support.
1
See infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened
standard of constitutional review, specifically, the compelling state interest and
least restrictive means analysis implemented for claims of religious
interference originally enacted under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993).
2
ALA. CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411493.01 (1999); CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 761.03 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 73-402 (2000); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
35/15 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4280.1-3 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-3240, 24-27-600 (2000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 110.003 (1999).
3
521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court held that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 was unconstitutional because Congress had exceeded
the scope of its section 5 enforcement powers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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be effective in lieu of a Federal RFRA in preserving the religious
rights of citizens of different states, they have been ineffective in
addressing the religious needs of prisoners.
Recently, both houses of Congress passed the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), a
federal law that, among other things, would restore a compelling
interest standard and a least restrictive means analysis to any
infringement upon a prisoner’s religious exercise of religion.4
President Clinton signed it into law on September 22, 2000.5 This
federal religious freedom legislation, however, will not likely
preclude the importance of state religious freedom legislation.
The constitutionally tenuous nature of the federal religious
protection legislation may only provide a short life span for
RLUIPA.6 If those states that have enacted RFRAs intend their
legislation to play an important role in the protection of religious
freedom of inmates, they should seek to apply their respective
standards of review to laws and regulations that interfere with a
prisoner’s right to free exercise. Although states have the
potential to provide more protection to prisoners’ religious rights
than the federal government, to date, they have not done so.
Part I of this note will discuss the importance of religious
freedom and the Federal RFRA, focusing on its impact on
prisoners’ free exercise rights. Part II of this note will address
the effectiveness of state RFRAs, concluding that current state
RFRAs appear to be ineffective in addressing the religious rights
of prisoners. Part II will also examine why state religious
protection legislation is necessary despite the recent enactment of
Id. at 519. The Court stated that “Congress’s power under section 5 . . .
extends only to enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .
[Congress] has been given the power to enforce, not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation.” Id. at 519.
4
S. 2869, 106th Cong. (2000); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc (2000); 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1 (2000).
5
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the
President, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/library/hot_releases/September_22_2000_2.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2000).
6
See infra Part II.A (discussing Congress’ troubles in enacting religious
freedom legislation).
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a federal remedy, the RLUIPA. Ultimately, this note will
conclude that even though religious protection legislation
currently exists for prisoners, those prisoners will ultimately need
state religious protection legislation in order to actually preserve
their religious liberties.
I. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: THE FAILURE
OF THE FEDERAL RELIGIOUS PROTECTION LEGISLATION
A. The Importance of Religious Freedom in America
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”7 The free
exercise of religion is a fundamental right secured by the First
Amendment of the Constitution.8 The importance of religious
free exercise in American life can be traced back to the
inhabitants of the colonies of Maryland, Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, Delaware and Carolina in the middle of the
sixteenth century.9 The early colonies were often seen as
sanctuaries for certain religious groups.10 In 1649, Maryland
passed the Act Concerning Religion, which contained the first
free exercise clause.11 In its colonial charter, Rhode Island

7

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id.
9
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 551 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (providing a historical outline of religious freedom in America).
10
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 551 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
11
Act Concerning Religion of 1649, reprinted in 5 The Founders’
Constitution 49, 50 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987); Boerne, 521 U.S. at
551 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Maryland Act provided that:
[N]oe [sic] person . . . professing to believe in Jesus Christ shall
from henceforth bee [sic] any waies [sic] troubled, Molested or
discountenanced for or in respect of his or her religion not in the free
exercise thereof . . . nor any way [be] compelled to the beleife [sic]
or exercise of any other Religion against his or her consent, soe [sic]
as they be not unfaithfull [sic] to the Lord Proprietary, or molest or
conspire against the Civill [sic] Government.
8
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afforded its citizens a “liberty of conscience,” which protected its
inhabitants from being “molested, punished, disquieted or called
into question, for any differences in opinion, in matters of
religion.”12 Other colonies also offered religious protection with
charters that contained similar language.13 These documents
“suggest that, early in our country’s history, several Colonies
acknowledged that freedom to pursue one’s chosen religious
beliefs was an essential liberty.”14Almost one hundred years
later, in 1789, the Federal Constitution in its Bill of Rights, and
every state constitution except Connecticut, had adopted a free
exercise provision.15
In modern society, religion is a right taken very seriously not
only by general members of the population, but also by the
nation’s political representatives. Many politicians do not view
religion in the abstract or even on a policy level, but instead,
make religious traditions and practices part of their own election

Id.
12

Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 1663, reprinted in
8 W. Swindler, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 363 (1979).
13
See First Charter of Carolina, Art. XVIII (1663); Fundamental
Constitutions for East New Jersey, Art. XVI (1683); Concession and
Agreement of the Lords Proprietors of the Province of New Caesarea or New
Jersey (1664); New York Act Declaring Rights and Privileges (1691); Laws of
West New Jersey, Art. X (1681).
14
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 552 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
15
THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin W.
Wright ed., 1961). In deciding whether or not to adopt a bill of rights, there
was much deliberation between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. The
Federalists believed that the rights to be protected in the Bill of Rights were
already secure in the Constitution, and that the protection of some rights,
might lead individuals to believe that other rights were not protected. Id.
Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, wanted their rights codified through
explicit assurances that the federal government’s power in the area of personal
liberty would be restricted mainly because of their concerns that the “Federal
Government would overwhelm the rights of states and individuals.” Boerne,
521 U.S. at 549. In the end, the view of the Anti-Federalists won out, and the
protection of religious freedom along with other individual liberties made their
way into the Federal Constitution. Id.
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platforms and legislative agendas.16 The importance of religion
has even united members of different political parties.17 Both
Republicans and Democrats seem to be in agreement on the
importance of religious rights, and members of both political
parties have embraced the issue by enacting legislation that
provides more protection to religious exercise than is mandated
under the Federal Constitution.18 In addition, both civil
libertarians and religious leaders, unlikely bedfellows, have
joined together in the endorsement of religious protection
legislation.19 Their union provides another indication of the broad
16

In the 2000 presidential race, the religious beliefs of presidential
candidates Al Gore and George W. Bush, both born again Christians, received
a tremendous amount of attention. Dirk Johnson, The 2000 Campaign: The
Voters; Hearing About God but Wondering About the Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2000, at A23, (stating that George W. Bush declared a “Jesus Day”
in his state and that Al Gore, before making a decision, often asks himself,
“What would Jesus do?”). Voters and media outlets also dedicated a
tremendous amount of press to the religious affiliations of Joe Lieberman, the
first Jewish vice-presidential candidate. Since his nomination, Lieberman has
often invoked the importance of his belief in God and in his values and belief
that more individuals would be better off if they had a stronger commitment to
religion. Gustav Niebuhr, The 2000 Campaign: The Religion Issue; Lieberman
Is Asked to Stop Invoking Faith in Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at
A19.
17
In order to provide greater protection for religious freedoms in the face
of state or federal laws that burden religion, even against laws that appear
neutral on their face but have the effect of burdening religion, Congress has
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (S. 578, 103rd Cong. (1993)),
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and has debated the
merits of the Religious Liberty Protection Act (H.R. 4019, 105th Cong.
(1998)) for over two years. Both the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (S. 2869, 106th
Cong. (2000)) were co-sponsored by Senators Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) and
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), politicians usually falling on opposite ends of the
political and ideological spectrum. S. 578, 103rd Cong. (1993).
18
See supra note 17 (noting the recent religious protection legislation
proposed by both major political parties).
19
For example, both the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs wrote letters expressing their
support for the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
the latest legislation that protects religious rights. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774,
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appeal regarding the protection of religious liberties.
B. The Rise and Fall of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Congress’ Attempt to Dignify Prisoners’ Free
Exercise Claims
The freedom to exercise one’s own religion is not absolute,
especially when examined in the context of prisons.20 While
religious liberty is a vital element of American political rights,
prisoners are often subject to a great deal of restrictions on their
religious exercise.21 Since prisoners are subject to twenty-four
hour control by prison authorities, the exercise of their religious
beliefs is often regulated; the day-to-day religious conduct of a
prisoner generally rests in the control of others.22 A prisoner’s
religious freedom, therefore, is a tenuous liberty. While
prisoners retain the right of free exercise, the Supreme Court has
developed a doctrine that affords prison officials much leeway in
limiting the free exercise of prisoners under the First Amendment
and significantly burdening their religious practice.23
S7777 (daily ed. July 27, 2000); see also 146 CONG. REC. E1563-01 (daily
ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (noting that the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act was “the product of the diligent
efforts of more than 70 religious and civil rights groups from all points on the
political spectrum”).
20
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (holding that an
inmate only retains those constitutional rights not incompatible with his status
as a prisoner).
21
See, e.g., Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.
22
Prisoners are “members of a ‘total institution’ that controls their daily
existence in a way that few of us could imagine.” O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing E.
Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and
Other Inmates, 1 (1961)). Prison is a “complex of physical arrangements and
of measures, all wholly governmental, all wholly performed by agents of
government which determine the total existence of certain human beings . . .
from sundown to sundown, sleeping, waking, speaking, silent working,
playing, viewing, eating, voiding, reading, alone with others.” Morales v.
Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wis. 1972); see also O’Lone, 482
U.S. at 354-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23
O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348 (finding that a prison regulation that restricted
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Many of the liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights apply
with particular caution to prisoners because of the dangerous
nature of the prison environment coupled with the state’s interest
in rehabilitation.24 Prior to a series of restrictive Supreme Court
cases, a prisoner’s religious rights could only be burdened by
regulations “based upon penological concerns of the ‘highest
order.’”25 A prisoner’s right to free exercise was tempered,
however, in 1987 by the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz.26 The O’Lone Court held that a prisoner’s
right to free exercise could be infringed if the infringement
relates to a “legitimate penological interest.”27 The Court found
that a prison restriction prohibiting Muslim inmates from
attending weekly Jumu’ah services,28 was reasonable, not only

Muslim inmates from attending weekly religious services was constitutional
because the regulation was reasonably related to “legitimate penological
objectives”).
24
The rights guaranteed to prisoners under the Bill of Rights and the
Constitution have often been held by the Supreme Court to be limited in
certain situations. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822 (holding that an inmate only
retains those constitutional rights not incompatible with his status as a
prisoner); see also, Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding prison’s
First Amendment restriction regarding inmate-to-inmate correspondence);
Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517 (1984) (limiting an inmate’s privacy
expectation in determining that he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his prison cell that would entitle him to Fourth Amendment protection); Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977)
(restricting prisoners’ First Amendment freedom of association rights by
holding that prisoners have no right to form a labor union to redress
grievances about prison security); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105
(1976) (holding that an inmate’s Eighth Amendment medical care claim must
prove that the person acted with “deliberate indifference”).
25
S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
1899 (emphasis added).
26
482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
27
O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352 (holding that a prison’s prohibition against
Muslim inmates attending a weekly Jumu’ah service in another prison building
was constitutional because the prison had determined that weekly attendance of
this service posed security risks and administrative burdens that prison
officials found unacceptable).
28
A Jumu’ah service is a weekly Muslim congregational service
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because it related to a legitimate penological interest—in this
case, prison safety and order—but also because the court found
that inmates were not deprived of the “ability to participate in
other Muslim religious ceremonies.”29 In a companion case,
Turner v. Safley, decided a week prior to O’Lone, the Court gave
deference to prison administrators by allowing them to restrict
inmate-to-inmate correspondence stating, “courts are ill equipped
to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform.”30 Moreover, the court found that
“running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that
requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources,
all of which are peculiarly within the province of the Legislative
and Executive Branches of Government.”31 This deferential
standard displaced the previous “highest order” standard,32 and
lower federal courts went on notice that they were to afford
deference to prison officials and administrators. After the O’Lone
decision, prisoners were forced to live with a burden placed on
their religious freedoms, and this burden did not require a
substantial amount of justification from those imposing it.
A burden on religion has often proved troublesome to
prisoners, many of whom attempt to rehabilitate themselves
through spiritual or religious practice.33 The deference afforded
commanded by the Koran that “must be held every Friday after the sun
reaches its zenith and before the Asr, or afternoon prayer.” O’Lone, 482 U.S.
at 344; see also Koran, 62:9-10.
29
O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352.
30
Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (citations omitted).
31
Id. at 84-85.
32
The Court established this “highest order” standard in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (stating that “only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion”).
33
See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (1969) (stating that
“[r]eligion in prison subserves the rehabilitative function by providing an area
within which the inmate may reclaim his dignity and reassert his
individuality”); see also O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that “[t]o deny the opportunity to affirm membership in a spiritual
community, however, may extinguish an inmate’s last source of hope for
dignity and redemption”); Comment, Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125
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to prison officials had detracted from the religious experience of
the prisoner, significantly limiting how a prisoner can express
himself through religion.34 Thus, with the application of O’Lone’s
deferential, rational basis approach to the religious rights of
prisoners, a prisoner’s ability to use religion as an essential
element of his rehabilitative process became quite tenuous, until
however, Congress enacted RFRA.
The judicially established burden on a prisoner’s right to
freely exercise his religion began to dissipate in 1993 when
Congress passed RFRA.35 Congress was reacting to the Supreme
U. PA. L. REV. 812, 853-54 (1977) (stating that an “inmate’s conscience is no
less inviolable than that of an unconfined citizen, and a violation could well
work an even greater harm upon the inmate, whose means of spiritual
recovery are limited by the prison environment”).
34
The deference afforded to prison officials in matters of religious
observance has provided the requisite authority for prison officials to deny
inmates the right to perform many of the most basic and meaningful religious
practices. See Rich v. Woodford, 210 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2000) (permitting the
State of California to execute a man without allowing him to participate in a
sweat lodge ceremony, an American Indian equivalent of a last rites ceremony
where the man claimed that through the ceremony he would be “purifying his
body, mind, and soul, [making] amends for the people he harmed on Earth
and [preparing] him to cross over from this world to the next”); Young v.
Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding an Illinois prison
regulation that restricted the wearing of yarmulkes); Kane v. Muir, 725
N.E.2d 232, 233 (Mass. 2000) (finding that a prisoner’s complaint alleging
confiscation of his rosary beads failed to state a cause of action).
35
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). Claims brought under
RFRA would be analyzed under a compelling interest test, as opposed to
claims brought under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause in which
prison administrators were given deference in their decision making that
affected prisoners. Id.
Congress set forth five separate findings regarding why it believed that
religious freedom legislation was necessary. Congress found the following:
(1) the framers of the constitution, recognizing free exercise of
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection on the First
Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws neutral toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments shall not substantially burden religious exercise
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Court’s ruling in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, which held that a neutral, generally
applicable Oregon law criminalizing the smoking of peyote was
applicable to Native Americans who smoked peyote for religious
observance.36 The legislation had two purposes that, in effect,
circumvented the Smith decision.37 The first was to “restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened.”38 The second stated purpose
of RFRA was to “provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”39
RFRA specifically provided that the “government shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability.”40 It further
provided that the government may “substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person (1) is in the furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive

without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion; and
(5) that the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing government interests.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(1)-(5) (1993).
36
494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990); see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512
(“Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court’s decision in
Employment Div. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith.”).
37
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b).
38
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citation omitted); see also Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that a “showing merely of a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest” would not justify
substantial infringement of party’s constitutional right to free exercise of
religion).
39
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(2).
40
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(a).
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means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”41
Claims brought under RFRA, unlike claims brought under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, were subject to
the rigorous constitutional standard of strict scrutiny and were
examined under a compelling state interest and least restrictive
means analysis.42
The legislative history of RFRA indicates that, while the
rights of prisoners were not explicitly mentioned in the text of the
statute, the drafters of RFRA expressly intended for the
legislation to apply to prisoners.43 A Senate report on RFRA
under the heading of “Application of [RFRA] to Prisoners’ Free
41

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2). RFRA was enacted as a direct
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dep’t of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a neutral law of
general applicability criminalizing the use of peyote should not withstand a
free exercise challenge from a group of Native Americans who claimed that
the use of peyote was an integral part of their religious practice). RFRA’s
purpose was “to restore the compelling interests test . . . in all cases where the
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb1(b)(1).
42
In creating RFRA, Congress provided another avenue that
supplemented the First Amendment’s religious freedom protection. 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1. Claims brought under the First Amendment
challenging the applicability of neutral laws that hindered religious freedom
would be reviewed with a deferential slant to the states. See Smith, 494 U.S.
872. A claim brought under RFRA, however, would clothe itself in the strict
scrutiny that a compelling interest and least restrictive means analysis requires.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2); see also City of Richmond v. Croson,
488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a minority set aside program was
unconstitutional because it failed to meet the strict scrutiny requirements to set
aside a certain percentage of jobs on the basis of race).
43
S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1892, 1899. The report also noted that those who drafted the Act did “not
intend [it] to impose a standard that would exacerbate the difficult and
complex challenges of operating the Nation’s prisons and jails in a safe and
secure manner.” Id. The Committee was confident that the courts would be
able to distinguish between claims based on a violation of religious rights and
claims that made under the guise of religious rights but brought primarily to
obtain special privileges. Id. at 1899-1900. The Senate Committee was
“confident that the compelling interest standard set forth in [RFRA would] not
place undue burdens on prison authorities.” Id. at 1900.
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Exercise Claims” noted that, “as applied in the prison and jail
context, the intent of [RFRA] is to restore the traditional
protection afforded by prisoners to observe their religious rights
which was weakened by the decision in O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz.”44 Congress was concerned that the religious exercise of
prisoners was being unduly burdened by prison officials and
administrators, and subsequently felt that the reasonableness test
established in O’Lone was insufficient.45 It believed that prisoner
claims should be addressed through “a more rigorous
standard.”46 Furthermore, Congress was wary of “inadequately
formulated prison regulations and policies grounded on mere
speculation, exaggerated fears, or post hoc rationalizations,” and
believed that such regulations and polices would not “suffice to
meet the act’s requirements.”47 Moreover, when Congress was
considering the merits of RFRA, an amendment was proposed
that would have “prohibit[ed] the application of [RFRA] to an
individual who is incarcerated in a Federal, State or local
correctional, detention or penal facility.”48 The Senate
overwhelmingly rejected this amendment.49 Thus, RFRA’s
legislative history demonstrates Congress’ intent—for courts to
44

Id. at 1899.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 1900.
48
139 CONG. REC. S14461-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (remarks of Sen.
Simpson). Senator Alan Simpson, in the Senate’s Judiciary Report regarding
RFRA, expressed his displeasure and concern that the provisions of RFRA
would apply with equal force to prisoners. See S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899. Senator Simpson was
specifically concerned about the effect RFRA would have on the increase in
prison litigation because he believed that the least restrictive means test would
allow “judges to establish their vision of how prisons should be run by forcing
state or Federal government to allow increasingly burdensome forms of inmate
contact.” 139 CONG. REC. S14461-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (remarks of
Sen. Simpson). Simpson also was concerned that inmates may “create
religions just to obtain special benefits or to avoid certain prison
requirements.” Id.
49
139 CONG. REC. S14461-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993). This proposed
amendment was defeated by a large margin in the Senate (58-41). Id.
45
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apply a strict scrutiny standard when reviewing actions brought
by prisoners under RFRA.50
Following RFRA’s enactment, several inmates brought free
exercise suits, and several federal courts, applying strict scrutiny
(a compelling state interest test coupled with a least restrictive
means analysis), found that prison officials had placed a
substantial burden on prisoners’ free exercise rights.51 The
Second Circuit, in Jolly v. Coughlin, held that a New York
prison’s mandatory tuberculosis testing program violated the
religious rights of a Muslim inmate who refused to submit to the
test for religious reasons.52 The court found that the policy of
sequestering those who would not submit to the test was not
narrowly tailored to the objective of quelling the spread of the
disease.53 Jolly was one of the first cases that demonstrated the

50

Although Congress sought to protect prisoners’ religious rights through
RFRA, and later, the RLUIPA, Congress has often restricted the rights of
inmates in other areas. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-134. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) has hampered
prisoners’ abilities to vindicate their rights through the federal courts. Id.
Among other things, the PLRA has hampered prisoners’ ability to vindicate
their rights through the federal courts, barring prisoners from bringing
litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they could demonstrate a “prior
showing of physical injury” and restricting their ability to proceed in forma
pauperis. Id. However, when protecting prisoners’ religious liberties,
Congress has gone to great lengths to insure the rights of prisoners. See supra
Part I.A (detailing the importance of religious freedom in America, even
between groups that span the political spectrum and accompanying discussion
of RFRA’s legislative history and its application to prisoners).
51
RFRA was effectively utilized by several prisoners as a method to
enforce their religious rights. See, e.g., Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d
Cir. 1996); Jihad v. Wright, 929 F. Supp. 325, 331 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
52
76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996).
53
Id. at 477, 479 (noting that, although the plaintiff was held in “medical
keeplock” for not submitting to the tuberculosis test, he “was not in
“respiratory isolation” from the general prison population, and therefore, the
“isolation of the plaintiff does not and could not further the state’s compelling
interest in protecting inmates and [Department of Corrections] staff from
tuberculosis,” especially when in the absence of respiratory isolation,
tuberculosis can be detected by “periodic submission to chest x-rays and
sputum samples”).
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effect that RFRA would have on prisons. The Jolly decision
indicated that the courts would, in effect, have their say in
dictating how prison officials should run their prisons.54 In this
example, a court was undermining a law of general applicability
relating to the health of a prison’s inmates, specifically by
dictating how a prison should maintain itself in protecting the
health of other inmates from a communicable disease.55 Many
have criticized this decision as undue judicial interference with
prison safety and security.56 It was a far cry from the deference
afforded to prison administrators in O’Lone.57 Formerly, a court
would have looked deferentially at a regulation enacted in the
interest of prison health because the regulation was considered
“reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”58 Under
RFRA, however, some courts began to look harder at prison
restrictions and the burden those restrictions placed on prisoners’
rights.59 Jolly indicated that RFRA could be utilized as a legal
weapon in the hands of prisoners to enforce their religious
rights.60
Other courts followed the Second Circuit’s lead. In Jihad v.
Wright,61 the Northern District of Indiana examined a prison
regulation that required Muslim inmates who refused to submit to
a tuberculosis (“TB”) test be placed on “restrictive medical
separation”62 and “housed in very restricted conditions with TB
positive inmates.”63 The court found that the prison’s policy was

54

Jolly, 76 F.3d 468.
See id.
56
See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S7991-02 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Thurmond).
57
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (noting that a
prison regulation is considered valid if it is rationally related to a legitimate
penological interest).
58
O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349-350.
59
See supra note 51.
60
Jolly, 76 F.3d 468 (1996).
61
929 F. Supp. 325, 331 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
62
Id. at 327.
63
Id. at 331.
55
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not the least restrictive means of preventing the spread of TB.64
In holding that, as a “less restrictive measure, officials could
have treated [the plaintiff] as an inmate at risk of developing
active tuberculosis by requiring him to submit to periodic chest xrays or sputum samples to determine if he had active TB and was
therefore capable of infecting others,” the court, in essence was
creating prison policy.65
When Congress initially considered the language of the
original RFRA, the term “substantially” in the substantial burden
analysis was a last minute addition.66 In fact, the House had
initially passed RFRA without the inclusion of the term
“substantially.”67 Is there really a difference between a
substantial burden standard and a burden or restriction standard
when applied to religious free exercise claims? Although
Congress adopted the substantial burden in its RFRA, the
definition of what constitutes a substantial burden in the federal
courts has differed greatly from circuit to circuit.68
Under the few prison cases analyzed under RFRA, courts
defined substantial burden differently. In Jolly v. Coughlin,69 the
Second Circuit, in determining whether a law or regulation
amounted to a “substantial burden” of an individual’s right to
freely exercise his religion, held that its “scrutiny extends only to
whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular belief and whether

64

Id.
Id.
66
W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise
Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 698 (1999) (explaining that the term
“substantially was added as a qualifier to the Federal RFRA as an eleventh
hour revision by the Senate, possibly as a counter to pressures to exempt
prisoners from RFRA coverage”).
67
See 139 CONG. REC. H8714 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Hyde).
68
Durham, supra note 66, at 703 (noting the different interpretations of
“substantial burden” by federal circuit courts).
69
See Jolly, 76 F.3d at 476 (noting that infringement upon a prisoner’s
sincerely held religious belief can constitute a substantial burden on one’s right
to exercise his or her religion).
65
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the belief is religious in nature.”70 The court went on to state that
an “inquiry any more intrusive would be inconsistent with our
nation’s fundamental commitment to individual religious
freedom; thus courts are not permitted to ask whether a particular
belief is appropriate or true—however unusual or unfamiliar the
belief may be.”71 In the end, the Second Circuit considered “a
substantial burden [to] exist[] where the state puts substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior or violate his
beliefs.”72 Jolly’s substantial burden analysis was quite
deferential to those bringing free exercise claims under the
Federal RFRA. First, the court established a deferential standard
in terms of what constitutes a religious belief.73 Second, Jolly
stated that religious exercise had been substantially burdened
when pressure had been utilized to encourage an individual to
alter or modify his beliefs.74
Other circuits were not as deferential to prisoners’ beliefs as
the Second Circuit in Jolly. In McNair-Bey v. Bledsoe, the
Seventh Circuit held that a prison regulation that forced an
inmate to wear his Moorish Science Temple of America pin on
the inside of his clothing rather than on the outside, did not
constitute a substantial burden on that inmate’s right of free
exercise.75 The Seventh Circuit noted:
70

Jolly, 76 F.3d at 476; see also Durham, supra note 66, at 695 (stating
that courts “should not get involved in weighing centrality as a factor in
eligibility for free exercise protection” and that “[a]llowing secular judges to
make centrality assessments can lead to profoundly inappropriate results”).
71
Jolly, 76 F.3d at 476; see also Durham, supra note 66, at 696
(“[C]entrality analysis may simply not fit some traditions. Concern with
centrality makes sense within religious traditions that have hierarchically
structured norms, some of which are central . . . and others of which are more
peripheral.”).
72
Jolly, 76 F.3d at 477.
73
Id. at 476.
74
Id. at 477.
75
See McNair-Bey v. Bledsoe, 1998 WL 879503, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 9,
1998). The court in McNair-Bey held that the inmate was required to establish
that “being able to wear his pin, displayed during religious celebrations and
concealed all other times prevents from engaging in religious conduct or
having a religious experience that his faith mandates.” Id. at * 2 (emphasis
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[A] substantial burden on the free exercise of religion
within the meaning of the RFRA is one that forces
adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously
motivated conduct or expression that manifests a central
tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, or compels conduct
or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.76
Other circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, agreed that this more
stringent standard should be used in order to determine if an
individual’s exercise has been substantially burdened.77 For
example, in Bryant v. Gomez, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the
plaintiff’s RFRA claim alleging that he had been denied the
opportunity to participate in full Pentecostal services that would
have included speaking in tongues and laying one’s hands on
others.78 The court dismissed this claim because the plaintiff
failed to provide “any facts to show that the activities which he
wish[ed] to engage in [were] mandated by the Pentecostal
religion.”79 The Ninth Circuit interpreted the substantial burden
standard to apply to prisoners quite literally.
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis of a substantial burden on
prisoners’ religious rights is similar to Seventh and Ninth
Circuit’s analysis. In Diaz v. Collins the prisoner plaintiff, a
“Native American religious practitioner,” brought an action
under RFRA, claiming interference with his free exercise of
religion because of prison regulations that restricted the length of
his hair, the wearing of a headband, and the carrying of a

added).
76
Id. (emphasis added).
77
The Ninth Circuit agrees with the Seventh Circuit that the “interference
[with religion] must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be
substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious
doctrine.” Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987);
see also Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that, in order to show a free exercise violation under the substantial
burden test, the inmate must prove that the law or regulation “prevents him
from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience that his faith
mandates”).
78
46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995).
79
Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
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medicine pouch.80 The court found that the plaintiff did not
demonstrate that his religion was substantially burdened because
the record “disclos[ed] that it is not necessarily a central tenet of
[the plaintiff’s] religion that a medicine pouch or headband be
worn at all times.”81
In 1997, the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores
declared RFRA unconstitutional.82 The Court determined that
Congress, which had relied on its enforcement powers under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RFRA, had
exceeded its constitutional authority.83 In finding RFRA
unconstitutional, the Court noted that Congress “has been given
the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation.”84 The Court stated that
Congress’ power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
is “remedial” and is not broad enough to encompass legislation
that “makes a substantive change in the governing law.”85 In the
absence of RFRA, therefore, the standard for evaluating an
inmate’s free exercise claim against prison officials reverted back

80

114 F.3d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
Id.
82
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
83
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Congress shall
have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions” of the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
84
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
85
Id. The Court stated that “RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to,
or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears instead, to
attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections.” Id. at 530. The
Court went on to state more generally that “legislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause.” Id.
Most circuit courts interpreting the Boerne decision have found that “the
Supreme Court invalidated RFRA only as applied to state and local law” but
continued to assume that RFRA “is constitutional as applied to federal law.”
Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., Nos. 9955850, 56489, 55934, 56005, 2000 WL 1335890 at * 9 (9th Cir. 2000);
Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir.
1999).
81
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to the “legitimate penological interest” or rational basis test
articulated in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.86
II. STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACTS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
PRISONERS’ RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ARE STATE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ACTS THE LAST HOPE FOR HEIGHTENED RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM PROTECTION FOR INMATES?
After Boerne pronounced RFRA unconstitutional, Congress
scrambled to enact similar legislation with the purpose of passing
the Supreme Court’s constitutional scrutiny.87 Congress first
attempted to restore the compelling interest standard to laws that
burdened an individual’s free exercise of religion through the
Religious Liberty Protection Act (“RLPA”).88 However, RLPA
did not gain the support needed to pass both houses of Congress,
mainly because many believed it would impede the effectiveness
of other civil rights legislation (the law offered a blanket
exception for religious freedom with respect to laws of general
86

O’Lone v. Estate of Shabbaz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). Since the Boerne
Court found that RFRA “contradict[ed] vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance,” the Court held that the Act, as
applied to the states, was unconstitutional. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
Reversion back to O’Lone’s deferential standard forced courts to make
decisions that, among other things, prevented death row inmates from taking
their Bibles to Bible study and allowed Texas school children to be disciplined
for wearing rosary beads that were claimed by the school to be gang symbols.
In Support of H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (July 14, 1998) (statement of Pat Nolan, President,
Justice Fellowship).
87
Less than a year after the Boerne decision, Congress was debating the
constitutionality of the Religious Liberty Protection Act. See, e.g., Hearing on
H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: House Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (June 16,
1998) (testimony of Douglas Laycock, University of Texas Law School). The
Religious Liberty Protection Act would essentially overturn the Smith decision
and return RFRA’s strict scrutiny test to laws and regulations that interfered
with an individual’s free exercise of religion. See 145 CONG. REC. H5580-02
(daily ed. July 15, 1999) (remarks of Rep. Myrick).
88
H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998).
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applicability).89 Other concerns arose from Congress’ enactment
of the legislation through its Commerce Clause powers.90
89

RLPA was proposed in response to the Boerne ruling. Senator Reid
stated the following with respect to its enactment:
[A] strict scrutiny standard [applies] to the actions of state and local
governments with respect to religious exercise, but attempt[s] to draw
its authority from Congressional powers to attach conditions to
federal funding programs and to regulate commerce. While the
companion measure passed the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly in July 1999, the legislation stalled in the Senate
when legitimate concerns were raised that RLPA, as drafted, would
supersede certain civil rights, particularly in areas relating to
employment and housing. Theses concerns were most troubling to the
gay and lesbian community.
[D]iscrimination based on race, national origin, and to a lesser
certainty, gender, would have been protected, regardless of RLPA,
because the courts have recognized that preventing such
discrimination as a sufficient enough compelling government interest
to overcome the strict scrutiny standard that RLPA would apply to
religious exercise. Sexual orientation and disability discrimination,
however, have not been afforded this high level of protection.
146 CONG. REC. S. 7774-01 at S7778 (remarks of Sen. Reid) (citation
omitted). See Cary McMullen, Canady’s Religion Bill on its Way, LAKELAND
LEDGER, Aug. 19, 2000, at D1 (noting that the RLPA, introduced in 1998,
“got lost” in President Clinton’s impeachment proceedings, and the same bill
introduced in 1999 passed the House but did not gain support in the Senate,
mainly because “gay rights supporters became skittish that [RLPA] might
allow religious persons to deny gays housing or employment on the grounds of
conscience”). Thus, there was concern that gays and the disabled, groups that
are afforded barely any constitutional protection, would suffer at the expense
of creating a compelling interest test for all laws that interfered with religion.
See 146 CONG. REC. S. 7774-01 at S7778 (remarks of Sen. Reid supporting
RLUIPA); see also Cary McMullen, Canady’s Religion Bill on its Way,
LAKELAND LEDGER, Aug. 19, 2000, at D1.
90
Hearing on H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998:
House Subcomm. on the Constitution of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (1998) (testimony of Michael P. Farris, Esq., Founder and President of
the Home School Legal Defense Association).
Quite simply, religion is not commerce. If RLPA is enacted,
Christians and other people of faith will not be able to seek legal
protection for [their] worship simply because it is commanded by
God. Instead we will be required to prove in court that our religion is
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In the period between the Boerne decision and the recent
enactment of the RLUIPA, the eyes of prisoners turned to the
states to protect their religious rights. While federal courts
reverted back to the deferential standard for free exercise claims
adopted in O’Lone,91 states remained free to do more in the way
of protecting religious liberties of its citizens.92 In fact, even after
the passage of RLUIPA, the importance of state RFRAs cannot
be underestimated, especially in light of the fact that there has
been speculation that the Supreme Court may find RLUIPA
unconstitutional.93
A. State RFRAs and the Substantial Burden Requirement: Do
Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico and Rhode Island
Make Things Easier for Prisoners?
Most of the states that have passed state RFRAs in response
to Boerne have done so with language almost identical to that of
the Federal RFRA.94 However, Alabama, Connecticut, New

interstate commercial activity.
Id.
91

See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabbaz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); see also
Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “[a]n inmate
is . . . entitled to a reasonable accommodation of his religious beliefs”);
Reynolds v. Goord, 103 F. Supp. 2d 316, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that
the working “standard of review for a prison regulation that impinges on an
inmate’s constitutional rights is . . . whether a prison regulation is ‘valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests’”) (citing Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
92
The deferential legitimate penological interest standard for prisoners’
free exercise claims was quickly reapplied after the passage of RFRA. See,
e.g., Jackson, 196 F.3d at 320.
93
See infra Part II.D.
94
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03;
IDAHO CODE § 73-402; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2000); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-40, 24-27-600; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 110.003.
These states all enacted RFRAs providing that the government shall not
“substantially burden” a person’s exercise of religion, even “if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability.” The state RFRAs went on to
adopt the notion that if a government were to burden an individual’s free
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Mexico and Rhode Island passed RFRAs with burden standards
that differed from the Federal RFRA.95 These states have
imposed a burden less than the “substantial burden” necessary to
sustain a Federal RFRA claim. Both Rhode Island and New
Mexico, instead of adopting the Federal RFRA’s standard
creating an action for any law that acts as a “substantial burden”
on a person’s exercise of religion, opted to apply a compelling
interest standard to any “restriction” placed on a person’s free
exercise of religion.96 Alabama and Connecticut have also
adopted a less rigorous standard than the federal one by requiring
only that the regulation “burden” the free exercise of religion.97
At face value, it appears that Alabama, Connecticut, New
Mexico and Rhode Island have made it easier for their citizens to
bring free exercise claims.98 While they have at least imposed
less burdensome standards, however, the question remains
whether the “burden” or “restriction” standard, as opposed to the
“substantial burden” standard, will allow more prisoners to bring
their free exercise claims.99 The prospects of the religious
exercise of religion, it must demonstrate that the application of the burden is a
“compelling governmental interest” and that the burden is “the least restrictive
means” of furthering that compelling state interest.
95
ALA. CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52571b (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
42-80.1-3 (1993).
96
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3.
97
See ALA. CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-571b (2000).
98
These states are using their authority to guarantee more rights to the
individual than the Federal Constitution allows. States have often provided
more rights than the Federal Constitution. For example, in People v. Class,
the New York Court of Appeals held that the New York Constitution provided
protection from an unreasonable police intrusion into the interior of an
automobile, where the Supreme Court had found no protection under the
Federal Constitution. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); People v.
Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431 (1986).
99
Although Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico and Rhode Island have
adopted a standard that on its face appears to be less restrictive than the
substantial burden standard, these statutes include no definitions or guidelines
regarding what may constitute a “restriction” or a “burden.” See ALA.
CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (2000);
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freedom legislation adopted in these four states are encouraging
to prisoners bringing free exercise claims in theory, but may not
prove to be as valuable in practice.
In consciously removing the “substantial” from their religious
protection burden standards, Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico
and Rhode Island may succeed in hearing the claims of prisoner
plaintiffs where the federal courts failed.100 Under a mere burden
or restriction standard, prisoners may have a greater chance of
getting their free exercise claims into court and of vindicating
their religious rights. The problem, however, is that none of
these four states define what a “burden” or “restriction” is under
their respective statutes nor explain how those terms should be
interpreted in the context of prisons.101
It appears as if only one state has even made a conscious
attempt to clear up the confusion wrought by the “substantial
burden” standard applied under the Federal RFRA. Idaho, in its
religious freedom legislation, provides that the term
“substantially burden is intended solely to ensure that this chapter
is not triggered by trivial, technical or de minimis infractions.”102
This provision in the Idaho RFRA attempts to delineate just
how broadly its substantial burden standard is to apply. However,
while it attempts to offer judges a guideline, the vagueness of its
substantial burden standard may have no actual effect on the way
judges apply the standard. Each judge may bring to the bench her
own value judgments regarding what constitutes “trivial,
technical or de minimis infractions.”103 This notion is especially
true with religious ideologies, where one man’s trivial infraction
is another’s serious deprivation. Thus, while Idaho’s attempt to
clarify the substantial burden standard is a noble one, judges still
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3
(1993).
100
See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the various interpretations of
substantial burden applied by several federal courts in analyzing prisoners’
claims under RFRA.
101
See supra note 99 (noting that none of the four states define “burden”
or “restriction”).
102
IDAHO CODE § 73-402(5) (2000).
103
Id.
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retain authority to determine what is or is not a “trivial, technical
or de minimis infraction,” and that standard has the potential to
differ from judge to judge.104
It appears as if inmates in Alabama, Connecticut, New
Mexico and Rhode Island will still have to take their chances,
despite the imposition of a standard that on its face appears to be
less stringent than the federal substantial burden standard.105 The
federal analysis indicates that the interpretation of what
constitutes a substantial burden often depends on the notion of the
reviewing court. Therefore, a state RFRA providing that a
person’s religious rights cannot be “substantially burdened” may
not, in theory, be a more rigorous standard than a state RFRA
that applies a “burden” standard.106 Thus, the responsibility in
interpretation rests with the courts of the states that have
established RFRAs; if the experience of the federal courts is any
indication, it may be difficult for state courts to apply these
different burden standards with any inkling of consistency.
B. State RFRAs and Explicit Statutory Provisions Regarding
the Religious Rights of Prisoners
Of the states that have adopted RFRAs, only South Carolina’s
legislation explicitly notes its application to prisoners.107 The
South Carolina provision reads:
A state or local correctional facility’s regulation must be
considered in furtherance of a compelling state interest if
the facility demonstrates that the religious activity sought
to be engaged by a prisoner is (1) presumptively
dangerous to the health or safety of the prisoner; or (2)
104

Id.
ALA. CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52571b (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
42-80.1-3 (1993).
106
See supra Part I.B and accompanying discussion of the different
interpretations of RFRA as applied to prisoners.
107
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-45 (“[T]his chapter does not affect the
application of and must be complied with Chapter 27 of Title 24 concerning
inmate litigation.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500.
105
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poses a direct threat to the health, safety, or security of
other prisoners, correctional staff, or the public.108
This statute, moreover, provides that a “state or local
correctional facility regulation may not be considered the ‘least
restrictive means’ of furthering a compelling state interest if a
reasonable accommodation can be made to protect the safety to
security of prisoners, correctional staff or the public.”109
The lines drawn by the South Carolina legislature may reduce
the amount of protection afforded to prisoners under its RFRA.
For example, take the facts of Jolly v. Coughlin,110 but imagine
that the case was brought in a South Carolina state court. Jolly
dealt with the clashing of a prisoner’s religious rights against
prison officials’ desire to quell tuberculosis, a communicable
disease.111 The court found for the prisoner plaintiff despite the
fact that prison officials were attempting control tuberculosis.112
Under the South Carolina statute, the courts are instructed to find
a compelling state interest when the religious activity sought to
be protected may “pose a direct threat to the health, safety or
security of other prisoners, correctional staff or the public.”113
Obviously, one’s refusal to submit to a tuberculosis test because
it violates the tenets of one’s religion qualifies as something that
may “pose a direct threat to the health, safety or security of other
prisoners [or] correctional staff.”114 However, the inquiry does

108

S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(A)(1)(2). This statute is made expressly
applicable to South Carolina’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act by S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-32-45.
109
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(B) (emphasis added). This reasonable
accommodation standard was the standard implied by many of the federal
courts after the Federal RFRA had been decided and the courts went back to
applying a more deferential standard to prison officials. See Jackson v. Mann,
196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A]n inmate is only entitled to a
reasonable accommodation of his religious beliefs.”) (emphasis added).
110
76 F.3d 468 (1996).
111
Id.; see also supra notes 52-55, 69-74 (discussing Jolly in greater
detail).
112
Jolly, 76 F.3d at 468.
113
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500.
114
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(A)(1).
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not end there. In South Carolina, the least restrictive means
analysis is buttressed by a deferential “reasonable
accommodation” standard.115 In other words, if it would take
anything more than a “reasonable accommodation” for a prison
to change its regulation, the regulation would survive the strict
scrutiny of the RFRA.116 Thus, if the facts of Jolly were applied
to a case arising in a South Carolina state court, there is a very
good chance the court could determine that a prison’s overhaul of
its entire tuberculosis policy does not, in fact, constitute a
“reasonable accommodation.”117 The Federal RFRA, on the other
hand, does not distinguish its least restrictive means analysis
between non-incarcerated individuals and prisoners.118 Thus,
although South Carolina’s “reasonable accommodation” standard
has not been defined by the courts, one could assume that,
because the standard has been distinguished from a nonincarcerated individual’s rights under its RFRA, it would work to
limit the success of prisoners’ free exercise claims by providing
more leeway and deference to prison officials.119
A “reasonable accommodation” standard seems to mirror
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz and its “legitimate penological
interest” standard in terms of the deference afforded to prison
officials.120 Non-incarcerated individuals are not burdened by this
deferential standard; it applies only to prisoners.121 Presumably,

115

S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(B).
Id.
117
Jolly’s least restrictive means analysis offered alternatives to the
prison’s medical keeplock program. Jolly, 75 F.3d at 479. The court
concluded that its suggested accommodations “represent[] a less restrictive
alternative, and the defendants are therefore required to pursue it.” Id.
118
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1.
119
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(A)(1).
120
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987). The
legitimate penological interest standard articulated in O’Lone was basically a
rational basis type test under which the courts were not delving deeply into
alternatives of prison administration as long as prison officials could justify the
regulation as being related to a legitimate penological interest. Id.
121
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(B), supra note 109 (discussing the
deferential “reasonable accommodation” standard).
116
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when a non-incarcerated individual brings a claim under South
Carolina’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a court would
apply a tougher standard of alternatives than the “reasonable
accommodation” standard. In all probability, South Carolina
lowered the bar out of fear that the accommodation of certain
religious practices may undermine the security and safety of the
prison system.122 Therefore, while prisoners are provided with an
extra layer of religious protection under RFRA, that protection
may not prove, when applied, to be very effective as a result of
South Carolina’s potential limitation requiring prison officials to
provide alternative measures to protect prisoners’ free exercise.
C. The Practical and Theoretical Ineffectiveness of State
RFRAs
While state RFRAs may be the most practical solution to
protecting prisoners’ religious freedoms in the wake of Boerne,
they have not accomplished this goal. Regardless of the
individual protections provided by state RFRAs, this legislation
has, until now, proven to be both practically and even
theoretically defective in addressing prisoners’ free exercise
concerns. This appears to be the case because, even though some
of these state RFRAs have been on the books for almost three
years, no prisoner has successfully litigated under the nine state
RFRAs currently in existence. The theoretical defect of state
RFRAs and their application to the rights of inmates arises
because prisoners do not possess the constitutionally guaranteed
right to travel.123 Thus, while citizens of the United States who
wish to take advantage of more stringent religious protection laws
are free to move from state to state, prisoners are left to rely on
whether the state that incarcerates them (or, the state in which
they are incarcerated) has enacted religious freedom legislation.

122

S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(A)(1).
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510-511 (1999) (holding that
“[c]itizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to choose
to be citizens of the state wherein they reside”).
123
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1. The Practical Problem: The Lack of Litigation Under State
RFRAs
While the Federal RFRA provided an ample forum for
prisoners to bring their free exercise claims, the state RFRAs do
not yet appear to have the same success in bringing inmates into
court.124 Prisoners brought over 250 free exercise claims in the
federal courts when the Federal RFRA applied to the states.125
Contrastingly, in the three years since Boerne invalidated the
federal RFRA and states began enacting their own RFRAs,
virtually no recorded prisoner free exercise claims have been
brought in reliance on a state RFRA.126 The only recorded cases
in which plaintiffs have brought free exercise claims under state
RFRAs have been cases in which religious institutions have
challenged a state or local zoning authority’s decision to deny a
building permit for a religious institution.127 Thus far, prisoners
have not benefited from the existence of state RFRAs, even in
those states that apply the less restrictive burden standard.128
It is quite puzzling that there have been no recorded prisoner
free exercise claims under state RFRAs. Granted, the pool of
petitioners filing under state RFRAs has decreased in relation to
124

See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing litigation brought
under the Federal RFRA).
125
See 146 CONG. REC. S7991-02 (Sept. 5, 2000) (remarks of Sen.
Thurmond).
126
Even the three states whose RFRAs run on a lesser standard than the
“substantial burden” standard have not had any documented prisoner free
exercise litigation.
127
See, e.g., First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami-Dade County, 768
So. 2d 1114 (Fl. Dist Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the church’s application for
special exceptions and non-use variances to expand school, and finding no
violation Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act); First Church of
Christ, Scientist v. Historic Dist. Comm’n, 737 A.2d 989 (Conn. App. Ct.
1999) (dismissing plaintiff’s action against defendant who had denied his
application for a certificate of appropriateness to allow the installation of vinyl
siding on its church building).
128
The lack of recorded cases reflecting prisoners’ use of these statutes is
indicative that prisoners have not yet taken advantage of their provisions. If
claims have been brought, those claims have not generated opinions.
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the amount of those who had filed under the Federal RFRA.129
This decrease, however, cannot explain why there have been
absolutely no recorded inmate free exercise claims under state
RFRAs. The fact that there are none, however, has shown that
the practical effect of state RFRAs has not lived up to the
possibilities that prisoners may have hoped for when they were
enacted.
2. The Theoretical Problem: State RFRAs are Ineffective as
Applied to Prisoners Because Prisoners Do Not Retain a Right to
Travel
It has long been a tenet in constitutional law that if a citizen
opposes a certain law or regulation of the state in which he lives,
that person has the right to move to another state and take
advantage of its laws.130 Thus for example, if an individual lives
in New Jersey, a state where there is no state RFRA, and she
seeks more protection of her religious freedoms, she can pack up
and move to Idaho, a state that has enacted its own RFRA.131 The
Supreme Court has endorsed the notion that an individual has the
right to travel, and that same individual who elects to change her
state residency avails herself of the laws and privileges of the
state she moves to.132 A state is free to enact legislation for the
benefit of its citizens.133 If individuals from other states support

129

Being a federal law, the RFRA provided a forum for any inmate in the
country to contest a prison regulation he or she believed violated free exercise
of religion rights. See 42 U.S.C.A. 2000bb-1. In terms of the number of
people it effects, state RFRAs are obviously more narrow in scope because
only prisoners living in that state can take advantage of the state religious
protections laws.
130
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510-511 (1999) (holding that
“[c]itizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to choose
to be citizens of the state wherein they reside”). The Court found this right to
travel inherent in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
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such legislation, they are free to move there.134 Likewise,
individuals who live in that state and are opposed to the
legislation in question, remain free to move out of that state and
avail themselves of the laws of another state.135
In the context of prisons, however, the right to travel has no
application.136 Under state RFRAs, prisoners are forced to have
their religious freedoms evaluated depending on where they are
incarcerated. Federal prisoners are especially affected because
they are often transferred to a state where they did not commit
the crime for which they are incarcerated. Prisoners may be
forced to live in states where there is no legislation applying a
compelling interest to a burden on their free exercise of religion.
Thus, state RFRAs are ineffective when applied in the prison
context because prisoners, unlike non-incarcerated individuals,
have absolutely no opportunity to avail themselves of the laws of
other states. Such an inconsistency supports the notion that a
uniform federal standard is necessary in order to provide some
consistency to inmate free exercise protection.
D. The Importance of State RFRAs Despite the Enactment of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act
State RFRAs may still remain important despite the recent
passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).137 The RLUIPA has restored strict
scrutiny to laws or regulations that “impose a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution” and land use regulations that “impose a substantial
134

Id at 511. The Court noted that “the States . . . do not have any right
to select their citizens.” Id.
135
Id.
136
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (noting that a prisoner
retains only those privileges and immunities “that are not inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner”).
137
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000) (protecting the religious exercise of
institutionalized persons); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(a)(1) (protecting land use as
religious exercise).
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burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious
assembly, or institution.”138 State RFRAs, especially in the four
states with a “burden” standard, remain vitally important because
of the raging debate regarding the constitutionality of the
RLUIPA.139 Many were astounded by the speed in which the
legislation passed both houses of Congress, especially in light of
the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the
constitutionality of such legislation in City of Boerne v. Flores.140
As a result of how quickly it was passed, some critics of the
legislation believe that more congressional hearings are necessary
in order to determine whether RLUIPA would pass the Supreme
Court’s constitutional scrutiny.141 Many are skeptical whether the
extensive hearings that surrounded both the Federal RFRA and
RLUIPA would quell the claims that RLUIPA was not adequately
debated in Congress.142 The call for more extensive debate is
essentially based on the inherent problems in enacting federal
legislation mandating that religion retain a certain federal
privilege against state and local zoning and prison regulations that
are considered generally applicable laws.143 These problems were

138

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(a)(1).
After the Boerne decision, Congress had to confront the challenge of
passing religious freedom legislation without exceeding its powers under the
Constitution.
140
See David W. Dunlap, God, Caesar and Zoning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
27, 2000, § 11, at 1 (noting that “[w]ith unanimity and astonishing speed—16
minutes elapsed from introduction to passage in the House of
Representatives—Congress has acted to exempt religious institutions from
land-use rules that excessively burden religious exercise”).
141
See, e.g., Editorial, Religion and Its Landmarks, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2000, at A24 (stating that the “first responsibility of Congress is to slow
things down and allow for hearings on a complicated matter that has received
not nearly enough public debate about its potential consequences”).
142
See, e.g., Peg Breen, President, New York Landmarks Conservancy,
Letter to the Editor: The Landmarks Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000, at A32.
“[W]hile there were prior hearings on a much broader version of this bill
[referencing RLPA], there has never been a fair representation of witnesses
questioning the bill’s constitutionality, necessity and effect. Unfortunately, the
bill has since passed—without hearings and without debate.” Id.
143
Most of the criticism surrounding RLUIPA has fallen on the provision
139
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addressed in City of Boerne, and Congress is attempting to
circumvent them now.144 Due to the likelihood that RLUIPA will
not withstand the scrutiny of the courts, state RFRAs remain
important tools, if utilized, to protect religious liberties of
prisoners.145
Congress enacted RLUIPA under its section 5 enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, its Interstate
Commerce powers and its Spending Clause powers.146 It is well
known, especially after Boerne, that the Supreme Court found
constitutional problems in Congress’ enactment of legislation that
provides religious groups and individuals special privileges
against laws of general applicability.147 Constitutional scholars
believe that the Supreme Court in Boerne already reprimanded
Congress with respect to how Congress used its powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment in its attempt to pass religious freedom
legislation.148 In order for Congress to enact legislation under
affecting land use regulations, not the provision that gives greater rights to
prisoners to challenge state and local regulations. See, e.g., Marci A.
Hamilton, When Churches Are Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2000, at A25
(detailing the negative effects of excluding religious groups from land use and
zoning ordinances); Juan Otero, Congress Moves to Federalize Local Land
Use Control; Measure Passes Under Guise of Religious Liberty, NATIONS
CITIES WKLY, Aug. 7, 2000, at 1 (stating that “simply put, the bill would
allow certain groups to disregard the rules as they are applied to everyone
else, regardless of the will of the community itself”).
144
Hamilton, supra note 143, at A25.
145
Hamilton, supra note 143, at A25 (claiming that RLUIPA is “unlikely
to survive a constitutional challenge”); Otero, supra note 143, at 1 (pointing
out the “serious legal flaws” of the approved measure).
146
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (enforcement powers); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8(3) (Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(1) (spending
powers). See also 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (July 27, 2000) (Exhibit
1: Need for Legislation) (noting that Congress’ basis for its congressional
authority to enact RLUIPA rests on the Spending Clause, the Commerce
Clause and its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
Constitution).
147
See Boerne, supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the
unconstitutionality of the RFRA).
148
See Boerne, supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the
unconstitutionality of the RFRA).
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section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “there must be a pattern
of widespread and persisting constitutional violations by the states
and the legislative solution must be proportional and congruent to
those violations.”149 The principal flaw of Congress’ enactment of
RLUIPA under Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment powers is the
claim that “supporters of RLUIPA have cobbled together a short
string of anecdotes that do not illustrate constitutional violations,
and certainly do not illustrate widespread and persisting
constitutional violations by the states.”150 In fact, some find
similarities to Boerne, and have argued that there has been “no
good evidence of widespread and persisting discrimination
against churches.”151 Simply put, constitutional scholars view
Congress’ enactment of RLUIPA as almost directly disobeying
the Supreme Court’s warnings, which were issued in Boerne,
regarding the use of Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment powers.152
Knowing that the Court took issue with Congress’ enactment of
religious freedom legislation under its section 5 Enforcement
Powers, Congress enacted RLUIPA under two of its other
constitutional powers: its power to regulate interstate commerce
and its spending powers.
However, the enactment of this legislation under these powers

149

Letter from Marci A. Hamilton to the United States Senate, July 24,
2000, at 1, available at http://www.marcihamilton.com/rlpa/rluipa/letter.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Letter from Hamilton to the Senate].
150
Id. Hamilton insisted that in almost all of the instances where religious
institutions had to bear the burden of a land use restriction, there was no proof
that the religious institution was the target of religious discrimination. Id.
Hamilton stated:
[It is] telling that no land use official, city official, organization
representing cities or counties, or historical preservation organization
has been permitted to testify on religious liberty issues. Instead the
hearings on the Religious Liberty Protection Act were stacked with
religious interests to the exclusion of those with the most knowledge
about land use practices.
Id.
151
Id.
152
See Boerne, supra note 82 (noting restrictions on Congress’
enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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has also generated criticism from constitutional critics.153
Specifically, those critics believe that the legislation will not
survive a challenge to its constitutionality.154 Recently, the
current Supreme Court restricted Congress’ power to enact
legislation under its Commerce Clause powers in its evernarrowing interpretation of the federalism doctrine.155
Constitutional legislation under the Commerce Clause must
“substantially affect” interstate commerce.156 Several critics of
RLUIPA are quite confident that the provisions of RLUIPA, on
their face, would fail the Commerce Clause’s “substantially
affects” test.157 Section 2 of RLUIPA provides in part, that strict
scrutiny should be given to land use and prison regulations that
only “affect” interstate commerce.158 Since it relies on

153

See Otero, supra note 143, at 2; Letter from Hamilton to the Senate,
supra note 149, at 1; Hearings on H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty
Protections Act: Before House Subcomm. on the Constitution of House Comm.
of the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Michael P. Farris,
expressing his concerns about using the Commerce Clause to pass religious
legislation).
154
See Otero, supra note 143, at 2; Letter from Hamilton to the Senate,
supra note 149, at 1; Hearings on H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty
Protections Act: Before House Subcomm. on the Constitution of House Comm.
of the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Michael P. Farris,
expressing his concerns about using the Commerce Clause to pass religious
legislation).
155
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the
Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with authority to enact civil
remedies of the Violence Against Women Act because the activities protected
in the act did not “substantially affect” interstate commerce); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that since possession of a gun in a
school zone did not “substantially affect” interstate commerce, the Gun Free
School Zone Act was an unconstitutional use of power under the Commerce
Clause).
156
See supra note 155 (indicating the narrow interpretation of what
“substantially affects” interstate commerce).
157
See Otero, supra note 143, at 2; Letter from Hamilton to the Senate,
supra note 149, at 1.
158
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(2)(B) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc1(b)(2) (2000)
(stating that courts shall use strict scrutiny when a “substantial burden affects
[interstate commerce]”).
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regulations that only “affect” interstate commerce, the Court is
likely to find that Congress’ enactment of RLUIPA under its
Commerce Clause powers is an unconstitutional use of its
powers. Other critics of the Commerce Clause are disconcerted
that Congress has linked the flow of commerce to religion.159
Critics have also questioned Congress’ use of its spending
powers to enact this legislation.160 Under the Spending Clause,
there must be a “nexus” between the activity regulated and the
spending condition that Congress imposes.161 Under RLUIPA,
strict scrutiny will apply when a “substantial burden is imposed
in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance,
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”162
Therefore, any entity under RLUIPA that receives federal
funding (and this includes most prisons), and adopts a regulation
that may substantially burden religious land use or an
institutionalized person’s free exercise, will be subject to strict
scrutiny. Critics of Congress’ use of the spending power to enact
RLUIPA believe that the flaw lies in the lack of a focused nexus
between the activity being regulated and the spending condition
being imposed.163 If Congress’ use of its spending powers under
RLUIPA is deemed to be over-inclusive and lack a central nexus
to its regulation, it will fail to survive a constitutional challenge.
Thus, if the Supreme Court invalidates RLUIPA, state
RFRAs will then be back in the religious freedom spotlight. Even

159

Hearings on H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty Protections Act: Before
House Subcomm. on the Constitution of House Comm. of the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (1998), supra note 153 (testimony of Michael P. Farris, expressing his
concerns about using the Commerce Clause to pass religious legislation,
especially since Congress has linked the idea of religious protection and God
with its power to regulate commerce, generally an economic power).
160
See Letter from Hamilton to the Senate, supra note 149, at 1 (“There
is no nexus in existence that can explain how the federal government can
burden every program touched by federal money . . . with such a burdensome
level of scrutiny and the surefire likelihood of litigation.”).
161
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
162
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1).
163
See Otero, supra note 143, at 2; Letter from Hamilton to the Senate,
supra note 149, at 1.
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if RLUIPA does pass a constitutional challenge, state RFRAs
may still have an important place in the protection of religious
freedoms of prisoners. If for example an inmate fails to prevail
on her RLUIPA claim because she has not proven that her
religion has been “substantially” burdened, she may still have a
claim in the state courts of Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico
or Rhode Island as the standard of the burden is a lower one.164
Even the states that do have a substantial burden standard provide
another forum for prisoners to test their luck to see how that
standard will be interpreted.165 This analysis depends on how the
different state courts decide what, in fact, constitutes either a
burden or a substantial burden.
CONCLUSION
RLUIPA has received vocal criticism regarding both its
purpose and constitutionality. Many constitutional scholars are
eagerly awaiting the day when the Supreme Court will strike
down the provisions of RLUIPA.166 Since the constitutionality of
RLUIPA is an issue that the Court is likely to address, the
importance of state RFRAs looms large. If the Court invalidates
RLUIPA, it will strike a near fatal blow to Congress’ hopes to
enact religious freedom legislation that provides significantly
more protection than the First Amendment’s Establishment
Clause. Congress has repeatedly attempted to carve out religious
freedom legislation that will satisfy the Supreme Court’s

164

See supra Part II.B (discussing the lower “burden” and “restriction”
standards of Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico and Rhode Island).
165
The other states’ RFRAs that work off of a “substantial burden”
standard have not yet articulated how that standard should be applied to
prisoners. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01; FLA. STAT. ANN. §
761.03; IDAHO CODE § 73-402; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-32-40; S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40, 24-27-600; TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 110.003. Theoretically, they could provide a less demanding
standard than the one adopted under the RLUIPA.
166
See supra Part II.D and accompanying discussion of the constitutional
flaws of the RLUIPA.
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scrutiny.167 If RLUIPA is struck down, the federal government
may be out of options to enact this type of legislation.
If they indeed run out of options to enact religious freedom
legislation, the responsibility of providing greater protection for
religious liberties will fall to the states. With respect to prisoners,
states will have free reign regarding how much protection they
want to offer the inmates of their respective states. Some states
have advertently chosen to adopt a lesser burden standard in their
RFRAs in order to get the religious freedoms claims of inmates
into court.168 Although these state courts have not actually defined
what that burden standard is, the fact that they have adopted a
lesser burden standard indicates that they want to provide more
religious protection to their prisoners.169 Only the test of time and
the result of litigation will prove what this burden standard really
is in practice. State religious freedom acts do matter and may be
a prisoner’s only option if RLUIPA is found unconstitutional.
Although the states have been somewhat ineffective in addressing
the religious rights of prisoners, they may be a prisoner’s last
hope in preserving more religious protection than the federal
government will offer. And they may even prove to be effective
if they continue to receive support in state legislatures and are
ultimately drafted carefully enough to avoid the unclear
interpretations that accompanied the Federal RFRA.

167

See supra notes 17, 87.
See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (regarding the burden
standard applied in Alabama, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Mexico).
169
See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (regarding the burden
standard applied in Alabama, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Mexico).
168

